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Abstract
Background: Despite the expanding literature on how reforms may affect health workers and which reactions they may
provoke, little research has been conducted on the mechanisms of effect through which health sector reforms either
promote or discourage health worker performance. This paper seeks to trace these mechanisms and examines the
contextual framework of reform objectives in Uganda and Bangladesh, and health workers' responses to the changes in
their working environments by taking a 'realistic evaluation' approach.
Methods: The study findings were generated by triangulating both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection
and analysis among policy technocrats, health managers and groups of health providers. Quantitative surveys were
conducted with over 700 individual health workers in both Bangladesh and Uganda and supplemented with qualitative
data obtained from focus group discussions and key interviews with professional cadres, health managers and key
institutions involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of the reforms of interest.
Results: The reforms in both countries affected the workforce through various mechanisms. In Bangladesh, the effects
of the unification efforts resulted in a power struggle and general mistrust between the two former workforce tracts,
family planning and health. However positive effects of the reforms were felt regarding the changes in payment schemes.
Ugandan findings show how the workforce responded to a strong and rapidly implemented system of decentralisation
where the power of new local authorities was influenced by resource constraints and nepotism in recruitment. On the
other hand, closer ties to local authorities provided the opportunity to gain insight into the operational constraints
originating from higher levels that health staff were dealing with.
Conclusion: Findings from the study suggest that a) reform planners should use the proposed dynamic responses model
to help design reform objectives that encourage positive responses among health workers b) the role of context has
been underestimated and it is necessary to address broader systemic problems before initiating reform processes, c)
reform programs need to incorporate active implementation research systems to learn the contextual dynamics and
responses as well as have inbuilt program capacity for corrective measures d) health workers are key stakeholders in
any reform process and should participate at all stages and e) some effects of reforms on the health workforce operate
indirectly through levels of satisfaction voiced by communities utilising the services.
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Background
In the last two decades, developing country governments
have implemented a variety of reforms in the health sector
on the understanding that these reforms would create the
right individual and organisational incentives for improv-
ing health systems performance. However, reform initia-
tives have not always considered human resource issues
that are relevant to their success and have often failed to
include the participation or perspectives of the health
workforce in reform planning processes and decision-
making.
A number of studies have considered the effects of reforms
on the health workforce [[1-5] and [6]] and highlight the
importance of human resources to the success of reform
objectives [7] as well as the complexity of human resource
management in the context of reforms [8,9].
These studies have pointed out that human resource
issues need to be a primary consideration in reform
design, suggesting that reforms can only be implemented
successfully where there is consensual participation on the
part of the workforce. Ngufor describes how health staff in
Cameroon perceived reforms as a punishment inflicted
on the nation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank and as a result developed a laissez
faire attitude to their work resulting in reduction of con-
sultation times and absenteeism [4]. Similarly, workers in
Zimbabwe were reported to perceive reforms as threaten-
ing their job security, salaries and training and expressed
their demotivation in the form of unethical behaviour
with their patients and neglect of work responsibilities
[6]. In other parts of the world, health workers have
resisted change on the grounds of conflicting values. In
Latin America, for example, reforms were perceived as
aiming to undermine the fundamental values that had
inspired the design of the system, and sparked off a wave
of resistance and strikes in El Salvador and Mexico. This
led to the stalling and delay of the reform process [10,11].
Other studies have noted higher motivation levels among
the health workforce through reforms. In Kazakhstan,
reforms that aimed at changing the old Soviet system
through the introduction of more market-oriented financ-
ing and service delivery, were argued to have resulted in
increased interest in primary care among physicians,
increased attention to quality and patient satisfaction,
more rational and creative use of resources, and stronger
commitment of physicians' personal time and resources
to improve services for patients [12]
Despite the expanding literature on how reforms may
affect health workers and which reactions they may pro-
voke, little research has been conducted on the mecha-
nisms through which health sector reforms either
promote or discourage health worker performance. How
do reforms affect the health workforce and create
responses that are likely to encourage the success or failure
of reform objectives? How does context influence the
routes through which reforms affect provider incentive
environments and eventually motivation and perform-
ance? To address these questions, the following paper
seeks to trace these mechanisms of effect and examines
health workers' responses to the changes in their working
environments by taking a 'realistic evaluation' approach
[13].
This approach takes account of the explanatory mecha-
nisms and the context of health systems reforms. This
stands in contrast to the more common evaluation
approach, which tends to focus on a reform programme's
measures and its intended effects and then seeks to meas-
ure the differences between reforming and non-reforming
entities, within the dimensions of those intended effects.
The research described above suggests that reform pro-
grammes cause a multitude of workforce responses which
act as the lynchpin between formal arrangements at the
outset of the reforms and the resulting changes in the sys-
tem as experienced by people who use it. Figure 1, origi-
nally created by McPake [14], captures the essence of the
scenario described above and provides a framework for
health systems research.
The focus of enquiry lies within the three components
outlined above. While the de-jure system sets the context
and defines the organisational structures, the intended
incentives and management procedures, the dynamic
responses reflect how those implementing the de-jure sys-
A conceptual model for health systems research – the  Dynamic Responses Model [14] Figure 1
A conceptual model for health systems research – the 
Dynamic Responses Model [14].
Dynamic responses: 
Informal structures
e.g. community groups
networks of friends
Informal behaviours
e.g. (offering or demanding)
under-the-counter payment
professionalism
Informal relationships p
e.g. clientelism 
political alliance 
De-facto system: 
Services as experienced by
people
e.g. access; quality
De-jure system:
Organisational structures 
Intended incentives
Management procedures
Training coursesHuman Resources for Health 2007, 5:3 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/3
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tem respond and create 'informal' arrangements or behav-
iours that may or may not encourage the success of
'formal' reform objectives initiated by the de-jure system.
The de-facto system then encompasses the lived experi-
ence of the results of the relationship between the de-jure
system and the dynamic responses. Similar to realistic
evaluation, the model emphasises the mechanisms of
effect between a social programme (component of the de-
jure system), and its impact (in the de-facto system), and
recognises these mechanisms as being social: involving
the interaction of human beings in a particular context
that determines the nature and form of dynamic
responses [14].
In this paper, we seek to focus on the mechanisms
through which unintended human resource effects have
arisen, using the case studies of Bangladesh and Uganda,
two countries that have faced many reforms attempting to
improve health systems performance and delivery of care.
Both countries have extremely low per capita expenditure
on health (Bangladesh has a public health expenditure of
14 international dollars, one of the lowest in the region
and Uganda's public health expenditure lies at 22 interna-
tional dollars) and face challenges in the attainment of the
Millennium Development Goals and national develop-
ment. After 20 years of military regime, Bangladesh
became a parliamentary democracy in 1991. With rigid
central government structures and disagreement between
the main political parties inhibiting response to local
health needs, the country began a wide programme of
reforms to address issues of responsiveness. In Uganda, a
series of reforms were introduced from the early 1990s as
part of a larger initiative to restore the health system fol-
lowing its collapse during the political crises of the 1970s.
Focusing on selected reforms in each country (see Table 1)
the first section of the paper outlines the scope of the
reforms implemented and provides observations on
workforce responses made by earlier evaluations. The sub-
sequent section then presents the results of this research,
exploring the impact of the mechanisms on social interac-
tions.
Methods
The paper is based on a study conducted in 2004 examin-
ing mechanisms of effect through which selected health
sector reforms have impacted on human resources in the
national contexts of Bangladesh and Uganda. The study
had the following main objectives:
1. To critically analyse health sector reforms in relation to
the macro-level environment (policy level analysis:
financing, regulation, organisation and management): or
to understand the contextual de-jure system.
2. To examine the pathways through which selected
reforms have impacted on the incentive environment for
health workers (authority and accountability structures,
career structures, staff recruitment, payment) and the
responses they have produced: dynamic responses
Study setting and design
The study was undertaken in six district zones in each
country. The study districts in both countries were identi-
fied using a socio-economic stratification method
employing the Human Development Index (HDI) rank-
ing. The HDI takes three main indicators into account: life
expectancy, educational attainment as a proxy measure of
literacy and GDP per capita as a measure of standard of
living. Together, these indicators show the level of need
and the capacity of districts to benefit from health inter-
vention [15]. The method was chosen to capture a wide
range of reform experiences across varying socio-eco-
nomic development levels. It was expected that recruit-
ment patterns, survival activities and community
responses might operate differently in districts of varying
prosperity levels, and that sampling across the develop-
ment level range would increase the breadth of experience
likely to be captured. Study districts were randomly
selected from three equal strata ranked by HDI, that is,
two districts were selected from each stratum. Tables 2 and
3 show the selected districts and their HDI ranking in
Uganda and Bangladesh respectively.
Table 1: Selected reform initiatives in Uganda and Bangladesh
Uganda Bangladesh
• Decentralisation of governance to district councils, 1993 • Unification of health and family planning services at sub-district level, 1998 – 2003
• Civil service reforms, 1990 onwards  Procurement
 Pay reforms • Training of health and family planning personnel at sub-district level, 1998 – 2003
• User fees implementation in 1992 and retraction in 2001 • Introduction of clinics at the community level, 1998 – 2000
• Health sub-district policy, 1999Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:3 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/3
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Methods of data collection and analysis
The information for the study was generated initially by
reviewing published and government documents and
then by triangulating both qualitative and quantitative
methods of data collection and analysis among policy
technocrats, health managers and groups of health pro-
viders. A comparison was made between providers in the
family planning and health tracks in Bangladesh and
between public and non-governmental organisation
(NGO) sectors in Uganda. The rationale for the compara-
tive groups was based on the nature of the major reforms
and the human resource groups that they targeted.
Documents – published and government reports from
both countries – were analysed in the formative phase of
the study which was undertaken with the purpose of
understanding the reform processes and focusing on their
objectives, design, implementation and structural impacts
on health workers at national, district and health facility
levels.
District level surveys of health workers were conducted
between February and June 2004. In Bangladesh, 703 pro-
viders were interviewed individually, while, in Uganda,
the total number of providers interviewed amounted to
800 (see Table 4 for breakdown of interviews per district).
A questionnaire that had been pilot-tested and translated,
where necessary, elicited health workers' perceptions of
the effects of the selected reforms on their organisation
and on themselves as workers. Scaled responses were used
to gauge perceptions of the following characteristics of
their job: management authority, accountability, career
development, recruitment pattern of staff and their
deployment, payment schedule, promotion opportunity
and survival strategy. Health workers could respond to the
close-ended questions with 'Strongly agree', 'Partially
agree', 'Do not agree' and 'Do not know', which allowed a
wider scale of responses and captured the middle ground.
In Uganda, all the staff working in the health centres at the
study sites were interviewed and an attempt was made to
interview at least 50% of doctors and clinical assistants
and 20% of nurses at the selected hospitals. Due to erratic
staff availability and attendance on survey days, these
guidelines were only partially followed. In Bangladesh, a
sample of health workers was taken from each of the four
different types of public health facilities located at district,
sub district and community levels. Clinical workers such
as medical assistants and family welfare visitors were
selected from the community level.
The quantitative data from both countries were analysed
using SPSS and presented in frequency tables.
Key Informant Interviews were conducted with district
level health managers and officials in the central govern-
ment ministries responsible for health, public service and
local government. The interviews focused on the context,
the content and the process of reforms and elicited per-
ceptions of how reforms affected ground-level realities
within health facilities and the workforce. In Uganda the
interviews were conducted by social science graduates
who had prior experience in qualitative data collection.
Table 4: Number of provider interviews by districts
Uganda Bangladesh
District Number of respondents District Number of respondents
Kampala 199 Jamalpur 121
Jinja 122 Cox's Bazar 115
Bushenyi 120 Moulvibazar 119
Mubende 139 Barguna 113
Moyo 102 Chuadanga 117
Arua 118 Gaibandha 118
Table 2: Uganda: Human Development Index of selected study 
district
Study district HDI Group rank
Kampala 0.593 High
Jinja 0.534 High
Bushenyi 0.456 Average
Mubende 0.458 Average
Moyo 0.361 Low
Arua 0.383 Low
Lira 0.405 Average
Table 3: Bangladesh: Human Development Index of selected 
study district
Study district HDI Group rank
Jamalpur ≥0.501 High
Thakurgaon ≥0.501 High
Cox's Bazar 0.401-0501 Average
Moulvibazar 0.401-050 Average
Barguna <0.401 Low
Chuadanga <0.401 Low
Sirajgonj 0.451–0.501 AverageHuman Resources for Health 2007, 5:3 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/3
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After two days of orientation regarding the study objec-
tives and methods, a semi-structured interview guide
developed by the core research team was piloted and then
utilised to conduct the interviews. The guide aimed to
explore the main domains of the reforms and their possi-
ble effects on human resources. The findings from these
interviews were used to identify the themes and questions
for the individual staff survey. In Bangladesh, questions
for the key interviews were drafted and discussed with the
Health Systems Development Programme office and con-
ducted by the principal and co-investigators at the
national level and by a trained research associate at the
district level. National level key informants were inter-
viewed about the reform processes and implementation
issues, while district level informants were asked to
respond to service delivery issues, practical experiences
and constraints at ground-level, as well as issues concern-
ing the coordination and cooperation of the two cadres
(health and family planning) in Bangladesh, their incen-
tives, workload and job environment.
Focus Group Discussions were conducted with different
cadres of health workers (nurses, midwifes and clinical
officers and associated field cadres) to explore how the
roles and support of the organisations concerning their
human resource management functions changed under
the reforms. In Uganda six focus group discussions were
held in Lira. The participants were grouped according to
their cadres i.e. midwives (three groups), nurses (three
groups) and clinical officers and allied health workers
(two groups). Members from each group were invited
from 2–5 health facilities to Lira, where the discussions
were held. The individual participants were selected from
a list of district personnel provided by the District Records
Officer. In Bangladesh, eight focus group discussions were
held in Sirajgonj. Here again the participants were
grouped according to their cadres (Upazila Family Plan-
ning Officers (UFPO) and members of the Ministry of
Mother and Child Health (MOMCH); Upazila Health and
Family Planning Officers (UHFPO); medical doctors from
the district hospitals; senior staff nurses from the district
hospitals; senior staff nurses from the Upazila Health
Complex; paramedical staff; Sub Assistant Community
Medical Officers (SACMO) and family welfare visitors
(FWV); family welfare assistants (FWA) and family plan-
ning inspectors (FPI)) and discussions took place at the
district hospital and Upazila health complexes. Upazila
refers to the Health Sub-district level in the Bangladeshi
health system. Guidelines for the topics were prepared
and discussions were conducted by a co-ordinator of the
study together with three trained research associates.
The qualitative information was compiled and analysed
following standard qualitative data analysis techniques
with master sheets enabling the identification of emerging
themes and quotes that illustrated the thematic issues.
Results
The context of reforms and their effects on intended 
objectives: de-jure system
Bangladesh
After partition from India in 1947, Bangladesh achieved
full independence in 1971 and became a parliamentary
democracy in 1991 after 20 years of military regime. With
rigid central government structures and disagreement
between main parties largely inhibiting response to local
health needs [16], Bangladesh began a wide programme
of reforms to address issues of responsiveness. The main
reforms in Bangladesh aimed at integrating the two sepa-
rate divisions of health services and family planning thus
unifying the two programmes with the intention of
improving their efficiency and responsiveness to the user
population.
Unification
The process of unifying service structures started in 1998
at the sub-district (Upazila) level and below with the
intention of gradually, and eventually, unifying overall
management. Unification entailed reorganisation and
restructuring of health and family planning delivery sys-
tems to ensure a common management structure. All
health and family planning activities at the Upazila level
were placed under the unified authority of the UHFPO,
who is a medical doctor by profession and formerly
belonged to the health directorate as a cadre. Family plan-
ning workers were moved to a formal civil service (recur-
rent budget) payroll. This shift had implications for
financial management, performance appraisal and work-
loads.
Historically, health and family planning programmes had
separate budgets and the drawing and disbursement of
funds were handled separately for each track. After unifi-
cation, the financial authority to draw and disburse funds
at the Upazila level was delegated to three officers: the
Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer in overall
charge, the Upazila Family Planning Officer and the
Maternal and Child Health Family Planning Officer.
The unification process reassigned the role of perform-
ance appraisal for both the management team at the Upa-
zila level and for the operational staff at lower levels. The
major change in the appraisal system was that individuals
from a different professional or programme background
were put in charge of appraising personnel [17].
The integration of family planning and health services
brought a new set of tasks to be carried out by all frontline
personnel. Thirty-seven tasks were identified as compo-Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:3 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/3
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nents of the health worker's job description at the com-
munity clinics [18]. Most of these new tasks were added
on to the work of family planning workers while a com-
paratively small set of tasks was assigned to workers of the
Health Directorate.
Procurement
The reforms in procurement and logistics management
created a centralised procurement with guidelines necessi-
tating a multistage procedure. The separate logistical man-
agement systems of health and family planning services
prior to the Health and Population Service Program
(HPSP) were replaced by an integrated logistical system,
including unified arrangements for procurement, storage,
distribution and transportation. The intention was to
improve service quality, motivate employees to perform
better and reduce cost. An evaluation of the procurement
system reported that quality and motivation problems
persisted. Continued drug shortages were attributed to
extra bureaucracy in the procurement guidelines, lack of
skills in the actual process of procurement, and financial
limitations [19].
Community clinics
In order to expand access and coverage to the essential
service package and to replace labour-intensive and costly
outreach family planning services with a cost-effective
package at one location, community clinics were con-
structed for every 6,000 population [20]. However, the
persistent unavailability of drugs and supplies reduced the
clinics to the provision of family planning and in some
cases child immunisation only [21].
Uganda
In the years after independence in 1962, the public service
of Uganda, including the health service, was regarded as
one of the most effective in sub-Saharan Africa. However,
health services for the most part collapsed during the
1970s and 1980s [22]. Since then Uganda has imple-
mented a series of reforms, specifically the decentralisa-
tion of service delivery and accompanying reforms in civil
service which were both aimed at achieving the goal of
making the central and local authorities function in an
efficient and democratic manner.
Decentralisation
Decentralisation of health care delivery in Uganda had a
dual context. The first entailed decentralisation of all gov-
ernment services that were delivered by the central gov-
ernment with the aim of devolving power to district
authorities. The second context was the transformation of
roles in the health sector in response to the decentralisa-
tion policy.
Matters relating to personnel were part of the decentral-
ised functions. A new structure, the District Service Com-
mission, was formed at the district level to perform the
functions of personnel management, under direct super-
vision and guidance from the national Public Service
Commission and Ministry of Public Service. The main
human resource management roles at the district level
were to identify staff requirements and their training
needs and to ensure that health facilities had the mini-
mum staffing requirements. In addition, the powers to
recruit, exercise disciplinary control, promote and to
remove persons from district service were delegated to the
District Service Commissions (DSCs).
A critical change in the employment system under decen-
tralisation was the demand-driven recruitment into the
district service. Each district would advertise the available
jobs within its department before any recruitment was
undertaken. This was a major shift from the previous cen-
tralised system where medical and paramedical profes-
sions were recruited by the Ministry of Health (MOH)
immediately upon graduation and posted directly to
selected workstations.
However, the revenue base of the local authorities was
poor and depended on grants from the central govern-
ment to pay the district personnel. Grants from central
government were enshrined in hard budget constraints
(conditional grants) that did not provide for local flexibil-
ity in resource allocation [23].
Civil Service Reforms
The civil service reform (CSR) programme was to address
four key areas: personnel management; organisational
structure; performance accountability; and service condi-
tions [24].
The excessive size of the Ugandan civil service was under-
stood to explain inefficiency, poor performance, and
inadequate pay and benefits. Between 1990 and 1997, the
public service was reduced by 54 per cent without a clear
agreement on the target-size of staff between the Ministry
of Finance and that of Public Services [25]. Further com-
ponents of the CSR included decentralising power over
personnel management to district service commissions,
introduction of results-oriented management (ROM) and
capacity building [22].
Pay reforms
By 1995, after salary increments totalling 85 per cent over
1986, wages and salaries in the civil service were still per-
ceived as being insufficient to maintain an adequate
standard of living [25,26]. After 1995, the pay reforms
were abandoned in light of deficient revenue collectionHuman Resources for Health 2007, 5:3 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/3
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and alternative demands concerning the initiation of a
universal primary education programme.
The first phase of the salary enhancement plans addressed
the judiciary and justice sub-sector. This boosted earnings
of the entry-level lawyers to a point that was three times
that of a consultant medical doctor. The perceived ineq-
uity was responsible for several strikes between 1990 and
1995 among medical staff. In response, a lunch allowance
for medical workers was introduced in 1994 [27,28]. Fur-
thermore, the government consolidated all allowances,
such as housing, medical and transport, into salaries but
at the same time imposed a pay-as-you-earn tax (30%) on
the consolidated salary; a decision that reduced the over-
all impact of the strategy to increase earnings. However,
the regularity of salary payments improved due to the fact
that earmarked finances were being sent to the districts as
conditional grants [27].
Due to budget constraints, the civil service recruitment
into the district service has been largely frozen since 1993.
Although local governments had the authority to recruit,
salary delays and arrears in the district payrolls resulted in
health workers salaries being reassigned to the central
government payroll in 2000 [29].
User fees
During the 2001 presidential election campaign, user fees
in the public health delivery system were outlawed. An
increase in the number of clients seeking services occurred
[29] as did stock-outs of drugs and essential supplies. The
Ministry of Health increased operational budgets to the
health facilities in order to cater for the increased demand
for drugs [30]. This, however, did not compensate for the
staff's loss of their previous supplementary income
through user fee revenues [31,32].
Health sub-district
Low accessibility to basic health services had persisted and
gaps in staffing especially in the rural health units were
attributed to weak management of health services below
the district [33,34]. A policy decision was made to further
decentralise health service delivery to the county level,
corresponding with the political constituency or the
"Health Sub-district" (HSD). In line with this process,
Health unit management committees (HUMC) were for-
malised and strengthened to oversee the work of the
health facilities and also act as the link with the commu-
nities.
Several strategies were adopted to achieve the HSD objec-
tives. These included the upgrading of some health facili-
ties to provide a comprehensive set of essential health
services as well as harnessing available hospital capacity
for disease prevention and health promotion activities. In
addition, the health sub-district personnel were required
to provide managerial support to 7–15 lower-level health
facilities within their defined geographical area [34].
These additional support roles added a substantial work-
load related to administration i.e. supervision, financial
management, coordination and reporting.
The human reactions to reforms: dynamic responses
Survey findings
Health personnel in both Bangladesh and Uganda
responded to a questionnaire covering questions on the
effects of reforms regarding issues such as management,
supervision, training, promotion, salaries, the availability
of drugs and supplies and incentives for remote deploy-
ment (see Table 5).
The survey data suggest that in Bangladesh the reforms
have affected the health staff and former family planning
Table 5: Percentage of health staff agreeing with statement on reforms
Bangladesh unification reforms Uganda decentralisation reforms
Health Family planning Public NGO
% Strongly or partially agreeing
The reforms have increased your chances of being promoted 8 7 50 51
The reforms have increased the chance for you to keep your job 31 64 55 46
The reforms have increased the objectivity of the appraised/performance 
reports
62 74 74 73
Your salary is always paid promptly 93 59 73 65
Your salary increments in the past couple of years have been satisfactory 47 38 19 19
The reforms have made your job description clear 67 83 60 55
The equipment essential to perform assigned tasks is available in sufficient 
quantities
75 56 63 58
The drugs and supplies required to accomplish your tasks are always available 70 32 70 65
The reforms have made your workload more manageable 64 83 52 49Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:3 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/3
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staff in different ways. While family planning staff con-
sider themselves to have least benefited from the reforms
concerning their salaries, promptness of pay and the avail-
ability of drugs, supplies and equipment, health staff
seem less satisfied with their job security and the manage-
ability of their workload. In Uganda, there appears to be
less satisfaction with workload and pay, but compara-
tively more satisfaction with promotion prospects. Gener-
ally, both in Uganda and Bangladesh, health staff seem
more satisfied with the objectivity of performance reports
after reforms.
The next section explores the multiple interactions
between the key players affected by the reforms and pro-
vides an insight into the positive and negative responses
triggered by the changes that took place in Bangladesh
and Uganda in the context of the reforms.
Interview and focus group findings
Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, the changes that had affected the authority
structures displayed a multitude of reactions amongst
health staff, who experienced the impact of reforms on
their management arrangements, performance appraisal
systems, promotional opportunities, payment schemes
and ultimately on their performance and provision of
services. The combination of unification efforts and the
adjustments to familiar arrangements resulted in a mix-
ture of responses and interactions between health and
former family health staff, their senior level management
staff and community members who had been involved in
the formation of the community clinics.
Management
Respondents reported that the unification at the lower lev-
els (Upazila and below) of the health and family planning
programmes and the resulting assignment of administra-
tive authority to personnel in the health track had caused
a conflict. Family planning directors and their subordi-
nates at the national and district level lost their authority
over staff at lower levels.
The informants at the district management levels in Bang-
ladesh were divided on the effects of the unification
reforms at the Upazila level and below. Civil surgeons
(managers on the health side of the divide) held optimis-
tic views about the new administrative and authority
structures at the Upazila. In contrast, the deputy directors
of family planning described how the changes had caused
turmoil in the functioning of the programmes. It was
reported that the new structures were dysfunctional and
had demoralised workers that belonged to the family
planning programme. The same split in perceptions
regarding the newly unified structures was observed
among the managers at the sub-district (Upazila) level.
The sub-district managers expressed difficulties in exercis-
ing their authority due to the continued, and sometimes
perceived as deliberate, interference by higher offices in
the functioning and allegiance of sub-district personnel.
Informants confirmed that the unification reform eroded
the authority of managers:
"We are supposed to supervise the Health Assistants, Health
Inspectors and Family Planning Inspectors but these people do
not follow our advice and orders and the boss (UHFPO) does
not instruct the persons to cooperate with us" (SACMO and
FWV group).
Complaints concerning the bureaucratic obstacles in
accessing administrative services at the management level
were also voiced in the focus group discussions. These
included delays in allowance payments and bribes that
workers felt obliged to pay to their managers for their
allowances to be approved and paid.
"We have faced problems with the three Drawing and Dis-
bursement Officers and more managers. To get the supplies,
transport and other allowances and bills paid we have to move
to several offices, which hampers our work and causes dissatis-
faction" (Senior staff nurses group, Bangladesh)
Performance appraisal systems
There had been a dual system of performance appraisal in
the unified structure. Historically, the family planning
personnel used a service book, which monitored the daily
activities undertaken by each worker. Given the prospects
for transferring the Family Planning personnel to the rev-
enue payroll, the service book was used as the basis for
successful transfer and in addition determined the level of
salary to be received upon transfer into the civil service.
The administrative arrangements assigned some of the
supervisory roles for the health service track personnel to
the family planning track officers and vice versa. Discus-
sants expressed suspicions about performance appraisal
reports by superiors who belonged to the rival track,
claiming Annual Confidential Reports were being used as
punishment and as a way to settle scores between person-
nel and supervisors.
Career structure and promotion
Although promotional and career structure problems pre-
ceded the reforms, the common perception in Bangladesh
suggested that the problems were aggravated or remained
unsolved. Unification reforms assigned a critical element
towards promotion, that is, annual confidential reports
(ACR) from the trusted vertical programme hierarchy to a
new set of officers. The competence of the new assessors
of performance was contested partly due to organisational
mistrust and possibly due to the dismantling of the well-
knit network of patronage in the previous structures.Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:3 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/3
Page 9 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
Salaries and promptness of pay
Predominant views emerging from the FGDs (focus group
discussions) suggest that salaries had not increased appre-
ciably under the unification reforms. Many health work-
ers expressed concerns over their income and mentioned
a number of strategies to cope with the insufficiencies.
Most strategies related to activities outside their official
work including cultivation, drug shops and work at pri-
vate clinics. Low and unpaid salaries were among the
dominant concerns arising from focus group discussions.
"We can hardly meet expenses for 2 weeks from our salaries.
We have to live at a low standard compared to the status we
hold. This is degrading" (FPO and MA at sub-district level).
Among family planning staff, delays in salary payment
were commonplace, prompting enthusiasm for promised
transfer to payment from the revenue budget, the same
payment scheme that health staff were benefiting from.
"For six months I have not been paid any salary. My wife asked
me if I am working at my job or doing other things" (FWAs &
FWI group).
"We are told that 40 per cent of our colleagues have been trans-
ferred to the revenue budget and the rest of us will be trans-
ferred soon. This will give us an opportunity to earn salary on
time" (Sub Assistant Community Medical Officer & Fam-
ily Welfare Visitor group, Bangladesh).
Personnel on the established government civil service
received their salaries regularly on the first week of the
proceeding month while those that remained on the irreg-
ular payroll still suffered from delays in their payments.
Respondents in Bangladesh suggested that the changes in
allowances had resulted from the scaling down of field-
work and the introduction of new administrative struc-
tures that threatened the established systems to access
allowances and challenged the long tradition of networks
that the personnel had built over time with their superi-
ors. As mentioned earlier, the distribution of financial
control across three different persons after unification
introduced tighter micro-bureaucracy and gate-keeping
that made access to allowance and claims difficult.
"To process the allowance bills, you go to the Upazila Family
Planning Officer and he tells you to go to the Upazila Health
and Family Planning Officer (UFHPO). The UFHPO tells you
to go back to Upazila Family Planning Officer and so on. The
bill is not paid for one month ... you have to travel to see what
has passed. When it is passed one has to pay commission to the
bosses and to the clerks. It is frustrating" (Family Planning
Inspector and Family Welfare Assistant group, Bangladesh)
Community expectations
In Bangladesh, community participation was demon-
strated by donation of a plot of land, construction of
buildings to house the clinics and the formation of com-
munity clinic groups (CCG) for clinic management. Ini-
tially most health workers applauded community
involvement, especially because it encouraged learning
about the constraints under which they were working.
During the interviews and focus group discussions, it
became clear that the health workers were aware of how
the changes in their performance and the effects on service
provision were perceived by the communities.
i. Availability of drugs and supplies
One of the stated objectives of the health sector reform
was to ensure that the procurement and supply of drugs to
the community clinics was brought under unified man-
agement and made more efficient in terms of cost reduc-
tion and saving time, thus ensuring steady and better
service delivery. Discussants stated that this objective had
not been reached and claimed that they were thus unable
to adequately perform their tasks due to the irregularity in
the provision of supplies. They further described how pro-
curement problems caused anger and incomprehension
among communities that initially had welcomed the
community clinics:
"There was enthusiasm among the community people and their
views about the Community Clinics were positive ... because
distances for minor illnesses were reduced. People were compet-
ing to provide land for the clinics but when the drug supplies
stopped, the people could not see the benefits ... their views are
now unfriendly" (Upazila Health and Family Planning &
Medical Officer group, Bangladesh).
"It is not serious to go to the clinic daily and sit there doing no
work. People come for family planning or cough and you tell
them there are no medicines. It is risky... some time they abuse
us and complain why we are being paid salary" (Sub Assistant
Community Medical Officer, Family Welfare Visitor group,
Bangladesh).
ii. Adequate service provision
In Bangladesh the service integration between family
planning and health services brought a new set of tasks to
be carried out by all frontline personnel. In effect, the inte-
gration added several services, for example, child immuni-
sation, basic treatment of ailments and directly observed
therapy (DOTS) to the family planning personnel. Views
emerged during the discussions with health staff suggest-
ing that family planning activities had been displaced by
their new tasks under integration, at Upazila level. ManyHuman Resources for Health 2007, 5:3 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/3
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participants indicated that the increase in workload left
less time for patients with family planning needs:
"I am required to provide services at the clinics and visit house-
holds for Family Planning. It is impossible to do all this work.
Family Planning suffers because there are many Expanded Pro-
gramme of Immunisation (EPI) clients to see at the clinic" (FPI
and FWA group, Bangladesh).
"At the inauguration of the CC we were supplied drugs once or
twice and the community response was good. But there are
fewer persons attending at our units [union level].... the clinics
have not received any supplies now six months after their [offi-
cial] opening" (group discussant SACMO and FW, Bangla-
desh).
Uganda
In the Ugandan context, the decentralisation efforts
brought about a rapprochement of local authorities, dis-
trict boards and health workers who previously had
enjoyed relative autonomy from local management struc-
tures. Here the closer contact and growing relationships
with local authorities together with the changes in
accountability structures brought about a multitude of
responses amongst health workers, specifically concern-
ing their recruitment patterns, job security, supervision
and relationship with community members.
Recruitment
The new authority structures that came with the decentral-
isation policy were the district councils, the district service
commissions and the health unit management commit-
tees. In the discussions, health workers had differing opin-
ions regarding the influence and newly acquired decision-
making powers of these structures regarding specifically
the issues of recruitment and supervision.
"Recruitment by the district is now faster and makes it possible
to get quickly on the payroll ... this was taking years before"
(District Director of health services, Uganda)
"When you go for the interview, these people (district service
councillors) interview you in the local language and use com-
plex parables and proverbs to fail you. If you do not understand
the questions you are technically out" (Group Discussant, Clin-
ical officers, Uganda)
"...some few, especially sons and daughters of those in positions
of influence in the district don't bother with the recruitment
process. They are just appointed." (Focus Group Participant,
Uganda))
Personnel working away from home viewed the process of
recruitment as inward looking and biased against workers
from districts that were not home to the new authorities.
Local informants explained that the expression "sons and
daughters of the soil" is widely understood to describe the
phenomenon of preference for workers who originate
from the district. While territorial patronage systems had
already been observed before reforms, respondents
claimed nepotism was present to a higher degree with the
relocation of decision-making authority to local bodies
under decentralisation.
Job Security
In Uganda, health workers with management responsibil-
ities expressed fears about their precarious relationships
with the local authorities. They claimed that their con-
cerns mainly arose from local authorities' decision-mak-
ing power in the dismissal of health workers. The views
below also point towards a patronage network that is
claimed to have strengthened under decentralisation.
"...For some of us who work in rural places if you disagree with
your sub-county bosses on any matter, that boss will automati-
cally make sure that he at least punishes you and you lose your
job" (FGD Midwife, Uganda)
"I think the relationship is good. If you give them [district coun-
sellors] what they want, they also make our work easy. .. Some-
times they take the only vehicle for burials or campaigns and we
hold back the activities. At the end of the day one has to be in
good books or you are thrown out" (Assistant District Health
Director, Uganda).
Supervision
In addition to the structural changes that influenced
recruitment patterns and job security, the type and focus
of supervising the health workers changed with the new
structures in Uganda. It was reported that HUMC, CAO
(Chief Administration Officer), DSC and local politicians
were increasingly undertaking the supervision of person-
nel and health facilities. Health staff described how before
decentralisation, supervision was geared more towards
the technical quality of workers encouraging them to
undertake new service roles or to improve their services.
According to their accounts after the reforms, supervision
took on a more human angle with the direct accountabil-
ity of health staff to selected community members. In gen-
eral, health staff seemed to appreciate the new changes in
their supervision since relationships to key community
members improved through tighter working relation-
ships.
"Decentralisation has fostered better supervision of facilities by
the district because they are now answerable to the people at the
district or within their areas of jurisdiction" (Secretary District
Service Commission, Uganda)Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:3 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/3
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"... The health unit management committee has come to realize
that the major problem is not selling of drugs but the small
quantities always supplied. Now the relationship is not so bad
as it was in the past" (Focus group discussant, clinical Officers,
Uganda)
Views also emerged from the focus group discussions in
Uganda that suggested the health staffs' relationships spe-
cifically with community leaders had changed with decen-
tralisation. There seemed to be an overall improvement.
"Leaders now appreciate the work we do and are keen to support
us. ... they have been articulating our needs for more staff at the
district council" (Key Informant Interview, Facility In-charge)
Despite several attitudes describing the positive relation-
ships and increased understanding between local author-
ities and health staff through the changes in supervision,
several statements displayed the workforce's concern
about relationships with those community members that
were less involved in overseeing the provision of health
services.
Community expectations
Communities expected the quality of services to improve
markedly when user fees were removed as had been prom-
ised during the presidential election campaigns. The
increase in the utilisation of health services after the
removal of fees put pressure on the availability of drugs
and supplies leading to marked shortages. Health workers
reported a sense of feeling caught in the middle of the
financial shortcomings of government and the high
expectations created by the publicity about the removal of
user fees.
"How do you expect us to handle that problem (too many
patients and too few drugs)? We used to buy drugs from the fees
but now we are just spectators. We tell them OS (out of stock)
and they say we are not kind to them" (Group Discussant, Clin-
ical Officers, Uganda).
Staff in Uganda described how communities were sur-
prised when medical supplies and drugs would suddenly
run out in times of need. In fact, FGD discussants reported
how patients would question the trustworthiness of
health staff in the facilities.
"There has been a concept... that medical people steal drugs
from health units. Drugs kits would be delivered and three days
later we would tell them (patients) that the drugs are finished.
They did not believe ...they would say that we have stolen the
drugs..." (Group Discussant, Clinical Officers, Uganda)
While the quantitative data provide a general picture of
staff attitudes and their responses to the reforms in the
two countries, the qualitative data explore how reforms
have been interpreted and perceived, and how dynamics
between key players reveal whether or not the workforce
is likely to consist of active and enthusiastic implementers
of reform or dissenters, actively or passively resisting
implementation. The findings from the qualitative
research suggest less satisfaction with the changes that had
taken place with the reform initiatives compared to the
survey results. This could be due to the nature of the meth-
ods, if people are less likely to answer negatively when
prompted with a questionnaire than in focus groups or
interviews, using open-ended questions.
Discussion
This paper has presented findings from a comparative
analysis of two country case studies investigating the
impact of health sector reforms on human resources in
Bangladesh and Uganda. Pawson and Tilley's [13] propo-
sition for realist explanation provided a useful framework
for the exploration of the mechanisms by which health
sector reforms affect health workers' micro environments,
thus changing provider incentives and creating a multi-
tude of responses. By using the dynamic responses model
for health system research, this paper provided an insight
into the de-jure system from which the reform objectives
were planned and initiated and traced the resulting
dynamic responses between different levels and types of
health staff and the communities.
In both Uganda and Bangladesh, reform planners
neglected the role of context in their planning of reform
objectives and assumed that the workforce would act as a
passive element in the reform implementation. In this
sense, the study highlighted several issues in both coun-
tries that demonstrate the importance of careful analysis
of contextual factors in the design and implementation of
reform objectives and the significance of recognising the
workforce as an important and adaptive factor contribut-
ing to the success or failure of the reforms.
In Bangladesh, the effects of reforms resulted in a power
struggle and general mistrust between the family planning
and health tracks. A strong sense of inequity in the nature
of effects of the reform was illustrated by family planning
personnel who perceived they had lost out while health
track personnel had gained from the reforms both in
terms of authority and actual reduction of tasks under
integrated provision. There remained considerable dis-
trust within the new unified structure, with reluctance to
take orders from the new managers. The non-unified top
administration above the integrated Upazila level was per-
ceived as a potential source of conflict and ill intent. In
addition, drug shortages and general procurement failures
emerged as a source of bad public relations between the
workforce and the communities despite originating inHuman Resources for Health 2007, 5:3 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/3
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broader systemic problems such as financing and budget
constraints that had already existed before the initiation
of reform objectives. The communities participated in the
planning process and priority setting through community
structures, however, their decisions were not binding
since the Ministries of Finance imposed budget cuts and
ceilings motivated by broader pressures in the economic
context.
On the other hand, positive responses from the majority
of former family planning staff expressed hopefulness
regarding the changes that would secure salary payments
and inequities in schemes and demonstrated optimism
concerning prompter salary payments under the revenue
budget. This suggests a rise in motivation levels in balance
with the right incentives.
Ugandan findings show how the workforce responded to
a strong and rapidly implemented system of decentralisa-
tion that had insufficient competence for human resource
management. Power of local authorities was influenced
by resource constraints and nepotism in recruitment. Sub-
sequently, these constraints suppressed the incentives of
workforce related to promotion, job security and profes-
sional growth. Health workers were more insecure as a
result of decentralisation due to their dependence on the
benevolence of the new authorities in order to guarantee
their jobs.
However, closer ties with selected community members
also had positive effects for health workers. It was sug-
gested that community leaders in their new supervisory
function were able to witness the precarious position that
health workers had as middlemen between budget con-
straints and procurement failures at higher levels of the
system and the communities who expected smooth run-
ning services and consistent availability of drugs and
equipment. In this sense, local leaders with their newly
acquired authority were able to lobby for necessary finan-
cial and human resources for the efficient operation of the
health centres.
While the de-facto system has not specifically been
addressed in this paper, the outcome of the relationship
between the de-jure system and the dynamic responses for
those that ultimately use the services are varying. While
users on the one hand may be confronted with demoral-
ised and in some cases absent staff, lack of necessary drugs
and equipment and dilapidated health facilities, the shift
of authority and supervisory functions towards the rural
districts, on the other hand, seems to have positively
affected communities who are now actively involved in
the shaping of their health service provision with their
newly acquired responsibilities.
Conclusion
This paper has emphasised several key points that are
summarised below:
1. By keeping the dynamic responses model in mind,
national and international reform planners can design
reform objectives that ultimately enhance and improve
services as felt by the communities by encouraging favour-
able responses amongst the workforce.
2. Reform planners need to take a closer look at the con-
text within which the health system operates in order to
recognise potential 'inhospitable elements' which may
hinder reform objectives or 'hospitable' elements which
may support reform initiatives and provide a basis for
improvements in the operation and management of
health systems.
3. Reform programs need to incorporate active implemen-
tation research systems to learn the contextual dynamics
and responses, as well as have inbuilt program capacity
for corrective measures.
4. Health workers are key stakeholders in any reform proc-
ess and should participate at all stages, that is, conceptual-
isation, design and implementation. Reforms tend to
create losers and winners or can change power structures
but it is important, at the least, that winners and losers
understand the purpose of change and have confidence in
the process of consultations on which change has been
determined.
5. How health workers perceive their relationship with the
community will affect their job motivation and perform-
ance. This is an important but neglected criterion for eval-
uating the impact of human sector reforms.
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